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“ The design of cryptographic systems must be based
on firm foundations, whereas ad-hoc approaches and
heuristics are a very dangerous way to go. ”
[32]
Abstract The current chapter aims at establishing a relationship between
artificial intelligence (AI) and hardware security. Such a connection between
AI and software security has been confirmed and well-reviewed in the relevant
literature. The main focus here is to explore the methods borrowed from AI
to assess the security of a hardware primitive, namely physically unclonable
functions (PUFs), which has found applications in cryptographic protocols,
e.g., authentication and key generation. Metrics and procedures devised for
this are further discussed. Moreover, by reviewing PUFs designed by applying
AI techniques, we give insight into future research directions in this area.
1 Introduction
In order to realize a cryptographic protocol or primitive, the assumptions
made to design those must hold. These assumptions relate in particular to
secure key storage and secure execution of the protocol/primitive, which have
been proven hard to attain in practice. The notion of root-of-trust has been
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Fig. 1: A conceptual illustration of a PUF: For PUFs, the inevitable effect
of manufacturing process variation is reinforced to enable PUF-based au-
thentication systems and key generation. To this end, the PUF is given an
input (i.e., a challenge) to generate a (statistically) different output (so-called
response) depending on the physical characteristic of the IC embodying that.
introduced to deal with this by providing adequate reasoning in relation to
physical security, i.e., the guarantee to resists certain physical attack cf. [54].
In this regard, physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have been identified
as a promising solution to secure key generation and storage issues [27, 29].
The key premise of PUFs is that physical characteristics of the system
embodying the PUF can be tailored to derive an instance-specific feature
of that, which is inherent and unclonable [54]. Among the variants of PUFs
being considered in the literature are the so-called “interinsic” PUFs, where
the above feature (1) is the result of the production process, and (2) can be
evaluate/ measured internally [33]. A prime example of PUF families meet-
ing these criteria is (some types of) silicon PUFs with manufacturing process
variations as the production process, as defined above. One of the main ad-
vantages of these PUFs is the easy-to-integrate aspect of them, enabling the
direct application of the PUF in integrated circuits (ICs). This is of great im-
portance for ICs used in not only every-day applications, but cryptosystems.
In the literature, a great number of research studies have been carried
out to evaluate the properties of PUFs, where at the heart of them is the
unclonability. Obviously, if this property of a PUF is not fulfilled, neither the
PUF nor the system encompassing that is secure. This chapter is devoted to
the relationship between PUFs and AI, where the latter is used in a natural
way to assess not only the security of PUFs, but also design PUFs. Among
such approaches, if we focus on machine learning (ML)-enabled ones, the
following interesting observation can be made.
For PUFs, as cryptographic primitives, one of the most effective techniques
to assess their security lies at the intersection of cryptography and machine
learning, namely provable ML algorithms. In addition to exploring the dif-
ference between such algorithms and ML algorithms commonly employed in
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Fig. 2: PUF Architectures. (a) A cell of SRAM PUF along with its CMOS
circuit [54]. (b) An Arbiter PUF. (c) A ring oscillator (RO) PUF. (d) An
XOR Arbiter PUF with chains of Arbiter PUFs. (e) A bistable PUF (BR).
(f) A twisted BR.
various fields of studies, this chapter describes why provable ML algorithms
should be considered when evaluating the security of PUFs. For this pur-
pose, pitfalls in methods adopted to demonstrate the robustness of a PUF
against ML attacks are explained. Besides, for this, the metrics that have
been defined in literature are mentioned.
We put emphasis on the point that this chapter does serve as neither an
introduction to the concept of PUFs, nor their formalization and architec-
tures. For these topics, we refer the reader to the seminal work and surveys
published over the past decades, e.g., [2, 55, 25, 54].
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2 Background on PUFs
PUFs exploit the process variations and imperfections of metals and transis-
tors in similar chips to provide a device-specific fingerprint. More formally,
a PUF is a mathematical mapping generating virtually unique outputs (i.e.,
responses) to a given set of input bits (i.e., challenges). These responses can
be used either to authenticate and identify a specific chip or as cryptographic
keys for encryption/decryption. To use a PUF in an authentication scenario,
the PUF has to go through the enrollment and verification phases. In the
enrollment phase, the verifier creates a database of challenge-response-pairs
(CRPs) for the PUF. During the verification phase in the field, a set of chal-
lenges from the verifier is fed to the PUF on the device, and the generated
responses will be compared to the stored responses in the database for veri-
fication. In this phase, due to the natural noisy characteristics of PUFs, the
verifier must resolve the noisy CRPs, i.e., for a given challenge, the response
could be different, when the measurement is repeated (so-called the reliabil-
ity problem). For this purpose, appplication of fuzzy extractors and majority
voting are the prominent examples [10].
There are several ways to categorize PUFs. One of the most well-known
ways to classify them is based on the amount of CRPs that they can provide.
PUFs with a small number of CRPs are considered as weak PUFs, and PUFs
with an exponential number of CRPs are considered strong PUFs. The most
prominent examples of weak PUFs are SRAM PUF, Ring-Oscillator (RO)
PUF, and Butterfly PUF. SRAM PUFs [38] exploits the random power-up
pattern inside an SRAM to generate a unique fingerprint. Since the inverters
inside each SRAM cell (Fig.2(a)) have mismatches due to process variations,
it is predictable at which logical value the cell is settled after power-up. In
this case, the challenge to the PUF can be the address of memory cells, and
the response is the value stored in each cell. The RO PUF, on the other hand,
utilizes the intrinsic differences between frequencies of equal lengths ROs to
produce the unique fingerprints. In the case of RO PUF [81], a pair of ROs
are selected by a given challenge, and the response is a binary value based
on the comparison of the RO frequencies, see Fig.2(c).
The underlying principles of the strong PUFs are very similar to weak
PUFs, i.e., exploiting bistable and delay-based circuits. However, in contrast
to weak PUFs, the components of strong PUFs are tailored together, in a way
that results in an exponential number of CRPs. The most preeminent strong
PUF is the Arbiter PUF family [51], where the intrinsic timing differences
of two symmetrically designed paths, chosen by a challenge, are exploited to
generate a binary response at the output of the circuit, see Fig.2(b). It has
become clear from the very beginning that the Arbiter PUF is vulnerable to
machine learning attacks. Therefore, XOR Arbiter PUFs and other Arbiter-
based PUFs have been proposed to mitigate the vulnerability of the PUF
to machine learning attacks, see Fig.2(d). Further research in the area of
strong PUFs has led to other strong PUFs constructions, which are inspired
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Fig. 3: The taxonomy of attacks launched against PUFs.
by bistable memory cells. The main instances of these classes are bistable-
ring (BR) [7] and twisted bistable-stable (TBR) PUFs [79], see Fig.2(e) and
Fig.2(f).
3 Attacks against PUFs
In the same vein as other security primitives, attacks and designs have been
coming hand in hand. Irrespective of the methods and means, through which
an attack is carried out, the goal of the adversary is to determine how the
inputs are mapped to outputs of the PUF, thereby predicting the responses
to unseen challenges. As broad as the range of PUF designs, attacks against
PUFs have covered the whole spectrum in terms of different levels of destruc-
tion that they could cause. At one end of the spectrum, there are invasive at-
tacks attempting to clone a PUF physically following a destructive procedure,
e.g., through Focused Ion Beam (FIB) circuit edit1 [36]. While fully-invasive
attacks can arbitrarily alter the functionality of the circuit and disable any
countermeasures, semi-invasive attacks with a lower level of destruction can
be launched to extract the “secret” from the PUF cf. [63]. Here, secret ex-
traction refers to the process of either reading-out the PUF responses [63]
or measuring some parameters that can be further analyzed to characterize
a PUF [83, 82]. The latter is, of course, of greater interest to attackers as
such attacks are not limited to memory-based PUFs. Interestingly, a group
of semi-invasive attacks may not even damage the underlying PUF struc-
1 Note that through this chapter, to classify the attacks, the step taken to clone a
PUF is considered.
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ture, see, e.g., [62]. Due to their nature, we categorize the above attacks as
“physical attacks,” see Figure 3.
At the other end of the spectrum are non-invasive attacks, where without
destructing the device, the adversary can observe/measure some challenge-
response behavior-related parameters. The latter case is similar to that of
side-channel attacks, widely studied in cryptography, and in particular, hard-
ware security. Not surprisingly, PUFs have also come under side-channel at-
tacks, which is not limited to memory- or delayed-based PUFs. An attempt
has been made by the authors of [68] to present an attack taking advantage
of remanence decay side-channels in SRAM PUF, which enables the attacker
to recover the response of the PUF. Additionally, under the principle of side-
channel analysis, an electromagnetic emission analysis against RO PUFs has
been reported in [61].
As the leakage from the helper data can be thought of as a side-channel
revealing some information regarding the PUF, attacks relying on this are
another particularly interesting examples of side-channel analysis. This type
of attacks has been mounted against RO PUF Constructions [13]. Similarly,
the power leakage from the fuzzy extractor used to perform error correction
has been exploited to recover PUF responses [42]. Another examples include
attacks, where the measurements are fed into machine learning (ML) algo-
rithms to predict the response of the PUF to unknown CRPs. Therefore, in
our taxonomy, we classify these attacks into the “AI-enabled” category, and
more concretely, in “Machine Learning” one, see Figure 3.
3.1 AI-enabled attacks
This class is composed of attacks enhanced by incorporating techniques bor-
rowed from the field of AI. In this regard, the application of machine learning
(ML) algorithm has become a prominent subject for research due to their
availability and ease of use. Nonetheless, other AI methods could be benefi-
cial, when it comes to the security assessment of PUFs. For PUFs, [70, 73]
are two of the first studies focusing on this by employing evolution strategies
and genetic programming against feed-forward Arbiter PUFs and RO PUFs,
respectively. In this context, the security of recently emerging PUF archi-
tectures, e.g., non-linear current mirror PUFs [47] has been compromised
through genetic algorithms [34].
Further application of such algorithms has been observed in [5], where
Becker et al. have applied an optimization technique relying on artificial evo-
lution, in particular, covariance matrix adaptation evolution strategy (CMA-
ES). In doing so, it has been shown that the security of an XOR Arbiter PUFs
embedded in a real-world radio-frequency identification (RFID) tag can be
compromised. Interestingly enough, to launch the attack, the reliability in-
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formation2 collected from the PUF has been further exploited that can be
thought of as a “side-channel”. A similar concept has been adopted against
Feed-forward Arbiter PUFs and leakage current-based PUFs, although fault
injection has been performed to assist the evolutionary algorithm [46, 48]. Re-
gardless of the issues raised about the convergence of the evolutionary strate-
gies, see, e.g., [66], its scalability, and reliance on the side-channels/injected
faults, these attacks have attracted a great deal of attention in the hardware
security community. Next, attacks have been explained that built on the idea
of learning the challenge-response behavior of a PUF through ML algorithms
as a subset of AI.
3.1.1 Machine Learning attacks
As explained before, the main goal of the attacker is to mimic the challenge-
response behavior of a PUF, preferably at the lowest cost. For this purpose,
given the CRPs exchanged between the verifier and the chip, it is natural
to think of ML attacks attempting to learn the mechanism underlying the
response generation. In the early stages of introducing PUFs it was assumed
that such attacks could not be successful [27]; however, soon after conjec-
turing that PUFs are hard to learn, it has been experimentally verified that
learning Arbiter PUFs is indeed possible [29]. This result initiated a line of
research, being pursued for almost two decades now and resulted in studies
covering various types of ML algorithms applied against a wide variety of
PUFs. Among the ML algorithms discussed in the PUF-related literature are
empirical and provable techniques, which we briefly review in this section.
Before elaborating on pure ML attacks, which are not refined by means of
side-channels, we focus on hybrid, physical-ML attacks.
Hybrid Attacks
The basic premise, on which these attacks are based, is the presence of physi-
cal, measurable quantities that either can enhance the learnability of the PUF
or, from another perspective, need to be analyzed through ML. While the
latter is being widely studied in other hardware-security domains, e.g., side-
channel analysis against cryptosystems, the former has become more popular
for PUFs. This has been partially motivated by the existence of PUFs, which
have been considered harder to learn. In this context, for XOR Arbiter PUFs,
it has been proposed to incorporate the timing and power information as side-
channels in order to improve the learning process [72]. Another example of
such attacks has been explained in [6], where controlled PUFs composed of
an Arbiter PUF and the lightweight block cipher PRESENT has come un-
2 Repetition of the measurement by giving the same challenge results in different
responses.
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der power side-channel analysis. The practical feasibility of these attacks has
been questioned as neither the accurate timing measurements nor precisely
measured power traces may be available.
This problem can be overcome by combing the ML and fault injection
attacks, although at the cost of being (semi-) invasive in some cases. XOR
Arbiter PUFs have been attacked following this observation, where the fault
is injected in a semi-invasive manner [84]. Nevertheless, fault injection pro-
cedures used to facilitate the learning process can be non-invasive as well;
however, the famous examples of such attacks have not employed ML algo-
rithms, but rather evolutionary strategies [6] and mathematical modeling [12]
(see Section 3.2).
Pure ML Attacks
Following the way paved by [29] to show the vulnerability of Arbiter PUFs
to the Perceptron algorithm, Lim has demonstrated that a support vector
machine (SVM) algorithm can also be used to learn the challenge-response
behavior of Arbiter PUFs [52]. This line of research is being pursued, which
has led to exploring the application of two groups of ML algorithms in the
context of PUFs, namely empirical and provable ML approaches. The former
is widely taken in various domains, including hardware security, whereas the
latter has been identified as a “sister field” of the cryptography and linked
to complexity theory [69]. A major success factor of the provable techniques,
in particular, Valiant’s provably approximately correct (PAC) framework, is
the link established between the probability of successful learning (so-called,
confidence level), the number of training examples and their distribution, the
complexity of the model assumed for the unknown function under test, and
the accuracy of the learned model [85]. Such relationships cannot be made
for empirical ML algorithms, more concretely, (1) the probability of success-
ful learning is not known and cannot be defined prior to the experiments,
and (2) the number of training examples cannot be determined beforehand.
Moreover, empirical ML algorithms can suffer from a lack of generalizability
and reproducibility. While generalization refers to the ability of the model to
adapt properly to unseen data, drawn from the same distribution as of that
followed to create the model, reproducibility means that an experiment can
be repeated to reach the same conclusion.
Although the above challenges are not specific to the security assessment
of PUFs, their evaluation may become impossible due to these issues. To in-
vestigate the vulnerability of a PUF with instance-specific features and sensi-
tivity to environmental changes, it is crucial to come up with ML approaches,
making standardization and comparison feasible. For these purposes, prov-
able ML algorithms seem promising. Next, a brief overview of empirical and
provable attacks against PUFs is provided.
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Table 1: Some of the attacks enabled by empirical ML algorithm, with a focus
on PUFs under attack, and models for representing the internal functionality
of the respective PUFs.
Ref. PUF under attack ML algorithm Mathematical model
[29] Arbiter PUFs Perceptron Linear combinations
of delays
[52] Arbiter PUFs Support Vector Machines
(SVMs)
Hyperplanes
[71] Arbiter PUFs, XOR Ar-
biter PUFs, Lightweight
Secure PUFs
Logistic regression Hyperplanes
[71] RO PUFs Quick Sort NA
[39] Arbiter and XOR Arbiter
PUFs
Artificial Neural Networks
and Support Vector Ma-
chines
NA
[79] Bistable Ring (BR) and
twisted BR PUFs
Artificial Neural Networks NA
[89] BR PUFs SVM LTFs
[86] Non-linear voltage transfer
characteristics (VTC)
Tree classifiers and bagging
and boosting techniques
NA
[44, 4] Double Arbiter PUFs [53] Deep learning NA
[77] XOR APUF, Lightweight
Secure PUF, Multiplexer
PUF and its variants
Deep learning NA
[88] Interpose PUF [67] Logistic regression Hyperplanes
Empirical ML Methods
As mentioned before, along with the development of PUFs have come ML
attacks [29]. These attacks have become more critical as Arbiter PUFs, XOR
Arbiter PUFs, Lightweight Secure PUFs [58], and RO PUFs have been suc-
cessfully targeted by applying logistic regression [71]. This work has been
followed by numerous studies that aim to assess the security of various PUF
families against different empirical ML algorithms. Table 1 summarizes some
of these studies by focusing on PUFs and the ML algorithms discussed in
those studies. In this respect, an interesting observation can be made that
except for some of the studies, no model, describing the functionality of the
PUF, has been taken into account3. Such models are viewed as “data trans-
formation” in empirical ML-related literature. In the absence of these trans-
formations, it is not straightforward to justify why an algorithm should be
chosen to perform the learning task.
Another remark is that some of the PUFs listed in Table 1 were proposed
as a remedy for ML attacks, but have been attacked by other algorithms. This
raises the question of whether the resistance to ML should be defined as resis-
tance to “known ML attacks”, which is answered in Section 3.3. In line with
3 Next, we discuss that for some provable techniques, this information is not required.
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this, another question is what to do to increase the security of PUFs targeted
by ML attacks? An illustrative example is XOR Arbiter PUFs, where adding
non-linearity through using the XOR combination function is suggested. Nev-
ertheless, to understand the effectiveness of such a countermeasure, it is not
enough to rely on specific ML algorithms that are not known how and why
they could break the security of a PUF. Next, we discuss this in further detail.
Provable ML Methods
What can be understood from the above discussion is that attacks mounted
by applying empirical ML algorithms depend largely on trial-and-error ap-
proaches. The importance of this problem becomes apparent as countermea-
sures designed to defeat them would also render ineffective. Moreover, since
security assessment with regard to empirical ML algorithms is algorithm-,
parameter-, and instance-dependent with no convergence guarantees, stan-
dardization and comparison between PUFs may not be infeasible. In response
to this, a provable ML framework, namely probably approximately correct
(PAC) learning, has found application in studies on PUFs.
Hammouri et al. have presented one of the first of such studies, where
they have attempted to prove the security of their PUFs through reduc-
tions to problems that are known to be hard to learn [35]. These type of
applications of PAC learning framework is further considered in Section 4.
PAC learning framework has also been employed to launch provable ML
attacks against PUFs. Families of PUFs targeted by PAC learning attacks
include Arbiter [22], XOR Arbiter [21], RO [20]4, and BR and twisted BR
PUFs [18, 19]. These results have been extended to the cases where the noisy
CRPs are available to learn a PUF [23].
PAC learning of BR and twisted BR PUFs serves as a special example
since no mathematical model describing their internal functionality has been
known so far; hence, no data transformation, or so-called “representation”
could be presented. Regardless of that, characteristics of these PUFs are
formulated as Boolean functions, useful to launch the attack. In this case, it
has been proven that, in general, the challenge bits have different amounts of
influence on the response of a PUF to a given challenge. Moreover, [19] has
reintroduced property testing in the PUF-related literature.
Property testing algorithms developed in ML theory examine whether
properties of a specific class can be found in a given function, i.e., a PUF
under test in our case. In doing so, if no representation is known for a PUF,
it is at least possible to understand whether it can be represented by some
functions. It could be a necessary step when looking for an appropriate, effi-
cient ML algorithm to learn the PUF. Furthermore, if an incorrect represen-
tation is chosen without either knowing the internal functionality of a PUF or
4 Note that although weak PUFs are not interesting targets from the point of view
of ML attacks, their characteristics can be analyzed by applying provable methods
and the metrics defined based on them cf. [16].
Physically Unclonable Functions and AI 11
performing property tests, it is not possible to decide about the learnability
of the PUF [15].
Last but not least, we stress that when interpreting the above results, a
great deal of attention should be paid to the setting of the PAC learning
framework (access granted to the CRPs, distribution of the CRPs given to
the machine, etc.) considered in a study. As explained in [15], this setting
plays an important role when deciding if a PUF is provably (in)secure (see
Section 3.3 for more details).
Attacks against PUF-based Protocols
In addition to PUFs as hardware primitives, PUF-based protocols have come
under attacks. In addition to mathematical attacks, AI-based ones have been
considered in the literature. In this regard, [9] has demonstrated that recent
Arbiter PUF-based protocols are susceptible to attacks employing the CMA-
ES algorithm.
3.2 Mathematical Modeling
The attacks in this class do not fall within the category “AI-enabled” attacks,
which is the main focus of this section; however, valuable lessons can be
learned from these attacks. In this respect, one of the key messages to convey
is that not every attack needs to be conducted with a view to adopting AI.
In other words, security assessment of PUFs relying on AI, albeit a useful
and important objective, should not be overstated as, in some cases, other
mathematical methods can give more insight into the security of PUFs. This
has been observed in a recent work of Zeitouni et al. [95], demonstrating that
standard interpolation algorithms can be employed to predict the responses of
(Rowhammer) DRAM-PUFs [78]. Another instance is the analysis performed
in [11] that has not only resulted in a high-accuracy model of the PUF under
test, namely Arbiter PUFs, but also linked the reliability of a PUF to CMOS
(and interconnect) noise sources and further to the PUF model. As shown
for Arbiter, RO and RO sum PUFs, the effectiveness of this attack can be
enhanced by injecting fault through changes in environmental conditions [12].
Another example of such attacks concerns the so-called “cryptanalysis”
of PUFs, where the adversary mounts computational attacks to predict the
response to an unseen challenge with the probability higher than that of a
random guess [75, 64]. For this purpose, she can use the CRPs to partition the
challenge-response space into subsets corresponding to the responses output
by the PUF. To evaluate the effect of their attacks, the authors have targeted
and successfully broken the security of RO PUFs with enhanced CRPs [57],
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composite PUFs [76] and the lightweight secure PUF [58], with multi-bit
responses.
Within this category, the analysis presented in [90] plays a crucial role
in understanding the mechanism of generating responses in BR PUFs. More
specifically, by carrying out linear and differential cryptanalysis-inspired at-
tacks, this study has shown that the response of a BR PUF can be determined
by a few number of the challenge bits. This work motivates the study of prov-
able techniques to quantify the influence of challenge bits on the responses
of PUFs [18, 16].
As the last instant, the attack presented in [17] can be considered, where
a lattice basis-reduction method has been applied to XOR Arbiter PUFs
with an arbitrarily large number of chains and controlled inputs and out-
puts, i.e., unknown challenges and responses from the adversary perspective.
These methods have first found in a number of cryptography problems, e.g.,
hidden subset sum problem as a variant of the subset sum problem with the
hidden set of summands. The similarity between this problem and controlled
XOR Arbiter PUFs can become evident as the side-channel analysis is con-
ducted to measure the accumulated delays at the output of the last stage of
the Arbiter PUFs in the XOR Arbiter PUF. It has been demonstrated that
this information is sufficient to reveal not only the hidden challenges and
responses, but also model the PUF.
Perhaps, the most important message of this study that we stress on to
conclude this section is that the failure of AI-enabled attacks per se should
not be considered as a guarantee for the security of PUFs. As explained
above, PUFs that are robust to some AI-enabled attacks, e.g., XOR Arbiter
PUFs with a large number of chains, can be vulnerable to other families of
attacks. These attacks can, of course, improve designers’ understanding of
mechanisms underlying the challenge-response behavior of PUFs, and conse-
quently, results in developing more attack-resilient PUFs.
3.3 Resiliency against ML attacks
The attacks discussed in the previous section have posed serious chal-
lenges for the PUF designers and manufacturers. To tackle this issue, vari-
ous countermeasures have been introduced in the literature, including con-
trolled PUFs [60, 93], re-configurable PUFs [60], PUFs with noise-induced
CRPs [94, 91, 87], to name a few. “Controlled PUFs” is the umbrella term
given to PUFs, where the adversary does have a restricted access to the CRPs
through either obfuscating the challenges/responses [26, 28] or mechanisms
used to feed the challenges/collect the responses [60, 93, 50, 92, 43, 50, 14].
When it comes to re-configurability, PUFs with a mechanism to update the
architecture of that are devised[49, 30, 31, 74].
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When reviewing the papers mentioned above and in this section in general,
it becomes evident that virtually all of the PUFs proposed in the literature
have been designed having ML attacks in mind. This seems, however, para-
doxical as attacks against PUFs, supposed to be ML attack-resilient, are
being reported, see, e.g., [9, 88]. The reason behind this can be due to the
lack of (1) procedures to prove that the PUF exhibits this feature, and (2)
metrics to assess whether a PUF is robust against ML attacks.
How to Prove the Security of a PUF against ML Attacks
Proving the security of cryptographic primitives has been practiced for
decades. For that, the security of the system must be defined, which is typi-
cally carried out through the definition of an adversary model and a security
game. The former determines the power of the adversary in terms of, e.g., be-
ing uniform/non-uniform, interactive/non-interactive, etc. Adversary models
further describe how the attacker interacts with the security game, whereas
this game itself gives insight into the power of adversary over the cryptosys-
tem, i.e., her access to the systems and the conditions for considering an
attack successful.
In addition to the elegant definition of security from the perspective of in-
formation theory, with the “perfect secrecy” as a special case, computational
complexity has been employed to argue about the security of cryptosystems.
Needless to say that this is natural as an adversary (a.k.a., “codebreaker”)
has bounded computational resources; consequently, making the codebreak-
ing problem computationally difficult is the designers’ attempt to ensure the
security. This definition of security in cryptography has been linked to ma-
chine theory in a seminal work of Rivest in 1991 [69]. Rivest observed the
reliance of cryptography and machine learning on computational complexity,
and further identified the similarities and differences between these two fields
of study, including attack types and the queries required by an ML algorithm,
exact versus approximate inference of an unknown target, etc.
To assess the security of a scheme against a learning algorithm, i.e., the
adversary, the ML setting is specified in the PAC learning framework. In
this regard, one defines the number of examples given to the algorithm, the
distribution from that they are drawn, a representative model of the tar-
get function (if any), and the accuracy of the approximation, for instance.
Afterward, if any polynomial algorithm can learn the target function describ-
ing the cryptosystem, the security of the system is compromised. For PUFs,
as cryptographic primitives, the same procedure can be followed; however,
approaches proposed in the PUF-related literature have not pursued this.
In particular, it is common that the robustness of a newly designed PUF
against ML attacks is evaluated by applying a couple of ML algorithms
against the PUF. This is indeed not sufficient to claim that the PUF is
robust against ML attacks in general. In the best case, if the experiment is
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repeated for numerous instances of a PUF to make the results statistically
relevant, one can claim that the PUF is resilient to the specific ML algorithm
applied in the experiment. In contrast to such an ad-hoc process, the secu-
rity of PUFs security in the face of ML attacks have been analyzed rigorously
in [24, 35, 93, 37]. Specifically, [24] has dealt with this from the point of view
of PAC learning and computational complexity. The security of a PUF pro-
posed in [93] has been based upon a result previously obtained with regard
to the PAC learning framework [21]. Herder et al. have also designed their
PUF on the basis of a reduction to a problem known to be hard to learn,
namely learning parities with noise.
We sum up by quoting from Shannon’s work that has argued against
imprecise proof of security.
“In designing a good cipher [...] it is not enough merely to be sure none
of the standard methods of cryptanalysis work we must be sure that no
method whatever will break the system easily. This, in fact, has been
the weakness of many systems. [...] The problem of good cipher design
is essentially one of finding difficult problems, subject to certain other
conditions” [80] (see also [3]).
Metrics for Evaluating the Security of a PUF against ML attacks
In order to verify the robustness of a PUF towards ML attacks in practice, a
set of metrics should be provided that is well suited to various ML attacks.
This task has been already accomplished for the purpose of verification that a
PUF exhibits features relating to the quality, a comprehensive set of metrics
has been developed, which comprises cost, reliability, and security [45, 56, 41].
The definition of a metric that can be associated with the ML attacks can
be traced back to studies devoted to designing a test for PUFs [59, 60]. The
proposed metric is, of course, not limited to ML attack since unclonability
is referred to as being resistant to reverse engineering and modeling (i.e.,
mainly non-physical attacks). Nevertheless, the metric is entropy that can be
estimated by the uniqueness, or measured by inter-distance [45]5.
In more concrete terms, unclonability due to the ML attacks is translated
to statistical prediction and measured by the Hamming distance between
two challenges [59]. It has been suggested that the unpredictability can be
achieved if Strict Avalanche Criterion (SAC) property is satisfied: by flipping
a bit in the challenge, each of the output bits flips with a probability of one
half [60]. This has been further improved in [65], where the authors have
shown that the distance between two challenges considered for computing
5 In addition to these, it is obvious that the bias in the PUF responses can be beneficial
to launch mathematical, in particular, machine learning attacks.
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the metric plays an important role. This is a prime example illustrating the
lack of firm foundations for evaluating of resiliency of PUFs to ML attacks.
To address this issue, as provable ML methods applied against PUFs have
become established, new metrics originating in Boolean and Fourier analy-
ses have been introduced [16]. In that work, the relationships between these
metrics and metrics previously used in PUF-related literature have also been
described. More importantly, the algorithms for testing PUFs in terms of
these metrics have also been made available cf. [16]. Recent developments in
the design and verification of PUFs with reliance on computational complex-
ity result in adding a new metric to the list of formally-defined metrics: the
expected bias [24]. The notion of the expected bias encompasses the average
bias of a PUF in the presence of the noise, inherent to the design of the PUF
due to, e.g., the effect of the routing, and/or having not sufficient deviation
in the manufacturing process variations. These phenomena not only affect
the responses of a PUF, but also induce correlation between two instances
of a PUF implemented on a platform. Hence, the expected bias is a suitable
measure to assess the security of PUFs, even ones composed of some PUF
instances, e.g., XOR PUFs.
4 AI-enabled Design of PUFs
Up until this point, we have focused on the interplay between the AI and
PUFs from only one angle of view that is applying ML to assess the security
of PUFs. From another perspective, it is interesting to explore how AI can
be employed to design PUFs. In the same way that ML-enabled attacks have
been classified, this type of PUF design can be categorized into provable and
empirical methods. In the second category, a PUF proposed in [1] can be
considered, where weightless neural networks (WNNs) have been adopted to
transform the challenges in the sense of controlled PUF. Another interesting
example of such PUFs has been proposed in [8], where a weak PUF relying
on the concept of asynchronous reset (ARES) behavior is designed. For this,
a genetic algorithm has been employed with a fitness function defined based
on the physical parameters of the transistors involved in the PUF circuit. In
their scenario, the genetic algorithm automatically outputs an optimal PUF
design for a given load.
On the other hand, in the second category, methods have been established
that rely on the impossibility of learning specific functions. These impossi-
bility results have been usually formulated in the PAC learning framework.
Note that the impossibility taken into account here is not due to the setting
chosen for the problem, e.g., representation, but the problem is inherently
hard to learn. To apply this notion in the design of PUFs, one of the first
proposals has been described in [35]. This work has been followed by [93],
where the design of the PUF is based upon a hardness problem proved for
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XOR Arbiter PUFs [21]. The study presented in [24] has demonstrated that
a family of function, known to be hard-to-predict (i.e., Tribes function) can
be applied to amplify the hardness of somewhat hard PUFs.
Herder et al. have further contributed to this topic by proposing a PUF
relying on the hardness of learning parity with noise (LPN) problem. This
problem remains open in computational learning theory, although it seems
that the LPN problem is not as hard as NP-Hard problems [40].
Finally, we stress that compared to techniques originating in ML and used
to attack PUF, not much effort has been invested in this topic. We expect
that lessons learned from the AI-enabled attacks, and in particular, ML-based
ones, become a tool for designing PUFs.
5 Conclusion
This chapter attempts to demonstrate how AI can offer the potential for
verifying that security-related features of a PUF are met. In this regard, the
application of AI is not limited to processing the data to, e.g., classify the
seen input-output pairs of a PUF and predict the output associated with an
unknown input (i.e., mounting an ML attack). On the contrary, when shifting
our focus to a provable ML framework, it is possible to come up with security
proofs in the sense of cryptography. This has been explained in detail in this
chapter, along with countermeasures, developed to protect PUFs against ML
attacks. Moreover, metrics and approaches to quantify the robustness of a
PUF to such attacks have been described. Last but not least, a new line of
research devoted to the design of PUFs through ML techniques is discussed.
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